**\*\*\*1NC**

# 1st

**The United States Federal Government should initiate a binding substantive environmental impact statement, including but not limited to a health impact assessment regarding lowering its antidumping tariffs on crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells from the People’s Republic of China and adopt such measure only if it can be made consistent with the results of the statement.**

**CP solves-public participation is key and equity norms make the plan more sustainable**

**Bratspies, CUNY law professor, 2010**

(Rebecca, “The Intersection Of International Human Rights And Domestic Environmental Regulation”, 8-20, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1662576>, DOA: 8-18-12, ldg)

There are many lessons to draw from the Chukchi Sea saga. For now, we will focus on how employing the emerging norms associated with the right to a healthy environment might have channeled agency discretion down paths that supported, rather than undermined, regulatory legitimacy. As hard choices are made with regard to priorities, the emerging international environmental norms of precautionary decision-making, advanced informed consent, intergenerational equity, and common but differentiated responsibility might have led to better, more sustainable decision-making. The NEPA requirement that the agency prepare an EIS before making a decision about leasing already serves a number of purposes related to those captured by emerging international environmental norms. First, an EIS promotes transparency by requiring the government to identify proposed actions and to solicit comments thereon. Second, an EIS promotes participation by allowing all interested to comment. However, the EIS requirement would be enhanced if it were interpreted in concert with the emerging international environmental norm of advanced informed consent and the right to environmental information. These norms embody a different and more robust concept of public participation than currently seen under United States law. They require the government to make the right to participate concrete by actively soliciting participation from groups, particularly indigenous groups, that might otherwise not participate in the decision-making process. If NEPA were interpreted along those lines, voices that typically do not get attention prior to post-decision-making litigation—if indeed they are heard at all—would become an integral part of shaping the EIS inquiry itself. As a result, the government would hear a more diverse array of voices when they could do more good—when the government is deciding the scope of activity to investigate, rather than at a later litigation phase, challenging a decision that is already a fait accomplis. Giving those typically under-represented groups a special role in the conduct of an environmental assessment, a new and improved EIS process would also help promote the additional emerging norm of inter-generational and intra-generational equity. Particularly where irreversible changes are contemplated, intergenerational equity would put a thumb on the scale for precaution, sustainably managing and preserving rather than overexploiting resources. Similarly, embracing the venerable international environmental norm that ―the polluter pays‖ (which dates back to at least the 1941 Trail Smelter Arbitration)91 would keep regulatory attention focused on the environmental effects of conduct like oil and gas exploration. A regulatory system infused with this principle would not sideline questions of environmental damage, and a court system that viewed polluter pays as an integral part of a justiciable human right would be far less likely to dismiss claims on political question or standing grounds. Because the Chukchi Sea process was so poorly managed from an environmental rights perspective, it also raises the question of whether a human right to a healthy environment could have restrained the government in its relentless attempt to promote oil exploration in this pristine area. When a government does not care about the environment and bends existing law to avoid giving force to environmental rights, would a claimable human right make a difference? The answer is both yes and no. A government bent on violating human rights can certainly do so. But, the existence of a vibrant jurisprudence of human rights means that it can no longer do so with impunity. If the United States recognized a human right to a healthy environment, it would have been much more difficult to play fast and loose with environmental statutes than it was for the Bush Administration in the Chukchi Sea. Such a right would remove the standing hurdle that keeps so many of these issues out of court. Even without a justiciable human right to a healthy environment, if existing United States‘ environmental rights were imbued with more of a human rights sensibility it might create a culture shift that would make scenarios like the Chukchi Sea leases less likely.

**Domestic change spills over to international environment leadership**

**DeSombre, Wellesley university environmental studies and political science professor, 2010**

(Elizabeth, “The United States and Global Environmental Politics: Domestic Sources of U.S. Unilateralism”, <http://www.polisci.ufl.edu/usfpinstitute/2010/documents/readings/DeSombre%20Chapter.pdf>, DOA: 8-18-12, ldg)

U.S. leadership (or even level of participation) in international environmental agreements has been mixed, and even can be seen as declining in the last decade and a half. To simply attribute this trend to U.S. unilateral urges misses the opportunity, however, to understand when and why the United States is more or less likely to lead internationally on environmental issues. Within a domestic framework that can make international participation difficult, it is nevertheless possible for the United States to exercise international leadership. It tends to do so on issues it has already addressed domestically and where the form of the domestic regulation fits the format of the international regulation being considered. Under those circumstances, domestic opposition to international action is muted or even avoided because such domestic industries, which have disproportionate influence on the senators who have to vote for ratification of any international agreements, either are not additionally disadvantaged by new international regulations or even welcome those that restrict the actions of their international competitors. To the extent that the United States returns to global environmental leadership under President Obama, it is at least as likely to be attributable to the change in the composition of the Senate as it is to executive branch leadership. The United States took an early lead in the domestic regulation of many environmental harms in the 1960s and 1970s, and those regulations set the groundwork for many international efforts to deal with the global versions of these problems. It is thus no surprise that the United States would be both willing and able to lead globally in addressing them. To the extent that the United States has more recently ceased in many issue areas to be a domestic innovator on environmental policy, it is also no surprise that the United States resists international action on newer international environmental issues. Although issues such as uncertainty and the effect on the United States of the environmental problem or the costliness of regulatory solutions certainly contribute to the difficulty of international regulation, where they are particularly important may be at the level of domestic regulation. Those who would prefer that the United States lead internationally should perhaps focus their efforts at creating the domestic regulations that give it the incentive to do so.

**US leadership key to multilateral cooperation on environmental destruction-it is the litmus test**

**Ivanova et al., William and Mary Government and Environmental Policy professor, 2008**

(Maria, “Reclaiming U.S. Leadership in Global Environmental Governance”, SAIS Review, 28(2), Summer-Fall, project muse, ldg)

What has confused analysts and policymakers, especially those overseas, is that the United States has manifested “inconsistent, hot and cold, national policies toward international organizations.” 6 While the United States was the driving force behind the creation of the United Nations in the 1940s, a number of the specialized agencies in the 1950s and 1960s, and the international environmental architecture in the 1970s, subsequent U.S. reluctance to join international agreements, limited support and even overt opposition to the United Nations, and preference for unilateral, voluntary, non-binding commitments have resulted in an almost perpetual crisis with multilateralism in general and the UN organizations in particular. At the core of this phenomenon lies American exceptionalism: 7 a sense that the United States is “so different in some important respects from other countries that it cannot (or it will not) fit comfortably into the decision-making and norm-setting structures of global political bodies.” 8 As the world’s only superpower, the United States is indeed in a unique position. Even in the face of increasing global interdependence and vulnerability to terrorism or other undeniably supranational threats, American exceptionalism persists, undermining meaningful international cooperation in many circumstances. Global environmental problems, and climate change in particular, offer a potential opportunity and platform for U.S. re-engagement in collaborative international affairs. Clearly, environmental challenges have global dimensions that illustrate the extent of interconnectedness of the earth’s ecology as well as its economic systems. Climate change has emerged as a top-tier threat 9 as the early effects of global warming are spreading across the planet, including the United States. Alaska’s permafrost is melting, taking down homes, roads, and livelihoods. Prolonged droughts in the West and Southwest have intensified the severity and frequency of wildfires and water reservoirs have dried up in the South. Ozone depletion due to chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other chemicals threatens to reduce agricultural productivity and leave people exposed to higher levels of ultraviolet radiation and at a greater risk of skin cancer globally. Over-fishing has led to a collapse of fisheries in most of the world’s oceans. Deforestation unleashes carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, reduces the capacity of forests to serve as carbon “sinks,” and eliminates the forest habitat that supports much of the biological diversity of the planet. These problems are notable because they represent “super-externalities,” 10 which inescapably require international collaboration. The logic of collective action in this global context is awkward but unavoidable. Ecologically, the actions of one actor or a small subset of actors might delay but cannot solve a problem if others continue to run-down natural resource stocks or spread pollution. Economically, national action is likely to generate diffused benefits (spread across the world) and highly concentrated costs (on producers and consumers in the country taking action). The resulting cost-benefit analysis almost always argues against action. The realities of national self-interest make it difficult to get harm-causers or natural resource users to confront the trans-boundary impact of their actions. As a result, global public goods, including international environmental protection—controlling pollution and managing shared natural resources—tend to be underprovided. 11 In the absence of a collaborative response that draws all harm-causers and harm-bearers into a regime that internalizes these externalities and provides an appropriate degree of global-scale environmental protection, a tragedy of the commons will likely unfold. 12 Pollution-causing activities will be conducted at a large scale, and open-access resources, such as the atmosphere and the oceans, will be over-exploited. Protecting shared natural resources and preventing environmental spillovers at a global scale makes sense in the context of a shared destiny, as countries move together as a world community to address common threats. To this end, as countries recognize their inability to address critical environmental problems on a national basis, collective response will spur the development of international institutions and organizations. Almost forty years ago, global environmental governance took shape as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was established as the core, or “anchor institution” for the global environment. 13 The organization was intended to serve as the world’s ecological conscience, provide impartial monitoring and assessment, be a global source of information on the environment, “speed up international action on urgent environmental problems,” and “stimulate further international agreements of a regulatory character.” 14 Subsequently, additional elements of today’s environmental architecture have sprung up under the auspices of the United Nations to address various environmental concerns. As new problems were identified, new organizations and agreements were established and a multi-dimensional system of global environmental governance developed. However, the earlier constructive engagement on the part of the United States has given way to a progressively more guarded and even openly hostile attitude.

**Extinction**

**Cayne et al., University of Chicago ecology professor, 2007**

(Jerry, “Jerry Coyne and Hopi E. Hoekstra | The Greatest Dying”, 9-24, <http://archive.truthout.org/article/jerry-coyne-and-hopi-e-hoekstra-the-greatest-dying>, DOA: 8-22-12, ldg)

Why, exactly, should we care? Let's start with the most celebrated case: the rainforests. Their loss will worsen global warming - raising temperatures, melting icecaps, and flooding coastal cities. And, as the forest habitat shrinks, so begins the inevitable contact between organisms that have not evolved together, a scenario played out many times, and one that is never good. Dreadful diseases have successfully jumped species boundaries, with humans as prime recipients. We have gotten aids from apes, sars from civets, and Ebola from fruit bats. Additional worldwide plagues from unknown microbes are a very real possibility. But it isn't just the destruction of the rainforests that should trouble us. Healthy ecosystems the world over provide hidden services like waste disposal, nutrient cycling, soil formation, water purification, and oxygen production. Such services are best rendered by ecosystems that are diverse. Yet, through both intention and accident, humans have introduced exotic species that turn biodiversity into monoculture. Fast-growing zebra mussels, for example, have outcompeted more than 15 species of native mussels in North America's Great Lakes and have damaged harbors and water-treatment plants. Native prairies are becoming dominated by single species (often genetically homogenous) of corn or wheat. Thanks to these developments, soils will erode and become unproductive - which, along with temperature change, will diminish agricultural yields. Meanwhile, with increased pollution and runoff, as well as reduced forest cover, ecosystems will no longer be able to purify water; and a shortage of clean water spells disaster. In many ways, oceans are the most vulnerable areas of all. As overfishing eliminates major predators, while polluted and warming waters kill off phytoplankton, the intricate aquatic food web could collapse from both sides. Fish, on which so many humans depend, will be a fond memory. As phytoplankton vanish, so does the ability of the oceans to absorb carbon dioxide and produce oxygen. (Half of the oxygen we breathe is made by phytoplankton, with the rest coming from land plants.) Species extinction is also imperiling coral reefs - a major problem since these reefs have far more than recreational value: They provide tremendous amounts of food for human populations and buffer coastlines against erosion. In fact, the global value of "hidden" services provided by ecosystems - those services, like waste disposal, that aren't bought and sold in the marketplace - has been estimated to be as much as $50 trillion per year, roughly equal to the gross domestic product of all countries combined. And that doesn't include tangible goods like fish and timber. Life as we know it would be impossible if ecosystems collapsed. Yet that is where we're heading if species extinction continues at its current pace.

# 2rd

The affirmative is a mimetic simulation of war, not an objective depiction of possible outcomes. Their methodology for policy making is to Imagine Impact scenarios and compare them in a virtual simulation. This divorces the simulated from the real and dominates all other forms of representation

Der Derian, 1999 (James, Prof. of IR @ UMass – Amherst and Brown University, “A Virtual Theory of Global Politics, Mimetic War and the Spectral State,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 93 (MARCH 24-27, 1999), pp. 163-176, JSTOR)

It might seem tendentious, especially at a time when world leaders and leading political theorists herald an epoch of democratic peace, to invoke a thinker and a concept drawn from an interwar experience. But are we not currently experiencing a similar acceleration of technological, social and political change? In the last decade, there have not been abrupt shifts in configurations of power but also in what Benjamin referred to as radical breaks in "the structure of experience," that is, how we think about and represent change. My question, however, stems not only from an appreciation of the conceptual powers of Benjamin but also from the official mimetic actions that are currently underway to plot an uncertain future. I refer to the mimetic powers of military and diplomatic simulation. Sold by their users as mere preparations for worst-case scenarios, they help to produce and delimit, through holistic training, hyperreal modeling and potential negative synergy, the dangers and possibilities of the future. Digitized, virtual war games and peace games, twice removed by scripted strategies and technological artifice from the bloody reality of war, take simulation into another realm. They take us to Jean Baudrillard's fractal turf of the hyperreal, where distinctions between the simulated and the real begin to break down. Baudrillard is willing to concede distinctions of a Baconian nature, stating: "To dissimulate is to feign not to have what one has. To simulate is to feign to have what one hasn't. One implies a presence, the other an absence."29 However, in societies suffused with virtual technologies, "the matter is more complicated, since to simulate is not simply to feign."30 Simulations produce real symptoms, hyperreal effects: "Thus, feigning or dissimulating leaves the reality principle intact: the difference is always clear, it is only masked; whereas simulation threatens the difference between 'true' and 'false,' between 'real' and 'imaginary.'"31 Things get further complicated when "the real is no longer what it used to be"32—an apposite description of post-Cold War attitudes—and the power of simulation, magnified by a fear of the future or a nostalgia for a mythical past, comes to dominate all other forms of representation. It becomes, says Baudrillard, "a strategy of the real, neo-real, and hyperreal, whose universal double is the strategy of deterrence."33 A neoliberal order that ultimately relies on the cyberdeterrence of an overwhelming U.S. superiority in military planning, logistics and information technology seems uncomfortably close to Baudrillard's simulacrum. Paul Virilio sheds similar light on the current shift of representation into what he calls the "virtual theatricalization of the real world": It has taken us from statistical management to electoral polls to video wars, until politics becomes a form of "cathodic democracy."34 An obsessive media vigilance over behavior combines with political correctness to transform democracy from an open, participatory form of government into a software program for the entertainment and control of all spectators. Speed enhances a global "shrinking effect:" "With acceleration there is no more here and there, only the mental confusion of near and far, present and future, real and unreal—a mix of history, stories, and the hallucinatory Utopia of communication technologies."35 The coeval emergence of a mass media and an industrial army was the signifying moment of modernity, of a capability to war without war, producing "a parallel information market" of propaganda, illusion, dissimulation. However, technological accelerants such as satellite linkups, real-time feeds, and high-resolution video threaten the power of television to dissimulate. Now the danger lies in the media's power to "substitute" realities. With the appearance of a global view comes the disappearance of the viewer subject: In the immediacy of perception, our eyes become indistinguishable from the camera's optics, and critical consciousness goes missing. In one of his signature, panoramic scans of contemporary society, Virilio early on captured the virtual effects of new media: In our situations of televisual experience, we are living in nothing less than the sphere of Einstein's relativity, which wasn't at all the case at the time that he wrote it since that was a world of trolley cars, and at most the rocket. But today we live in a space of relativity and non-separability. Our image of time is an image of instantaneity and ubiquity. And there's a stunning general lack of understanding of speed, a lack of awareness of the essence of speed . . . .And this passage from an extensive to an intensive time will have considerable impact on all the various aspects of the conditions of our society : it leads to a radical reorganization both of our social mores and our image of the world. This is the source of the feeling that we're faced with an epoch in many ways comparable to the Renaissance: it's an epoch in which the real world and our image of the world no longer coincide.36

The impact is twofold—

First, the mimetic construction of war makes wars inevitable—it requires the construction of an “evil” enemy and makes extermination viable—extinction becomes necessary because it is the only predictable outcome

Der Derian, 2003 (James, Prof. of IR and polisci @ UMass – Amherst and Brown University, “War as Game,” THE BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS, pp.45-6)

The charge of moral equivalency—in which any attempt at explanation is identified as an act of exoneration—should not deter investigations into the dangers of the mimetic relationships operating in war and games. People go to war not only out of rational calculation but also because of how they see, perceive, picture, imagine, and speak of each other: that is, how they construct the difference of other groups as well as the sameness of their own. Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein are not the first to mine this act of mimesis for political advantage. From Greek tragedy and Roman gladiatorial spectacles to futurist art and fascist rallies, mimetic violence has regularly overpowered democratic discourse. The question, then, is how long after Baghdad has fallen will this mimetic game of terror and counter-terror last? Bush, Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein need their mimetic foes—it takes two to play. Without a reciprocal hatred, their politics and prophecies lose their self-fulfilling powers. Historically, terrorist movements either evolve into states, or, without a mass base, they quickly weaken and rarely last longer than a decade. And empires inevitably, by over-reach or defeat, fall. However, this mimetic struggle, magnified by the media, fought by advanced technologies of destruction, and unchecked by the UN or U.S. allies, has now developed a logic of its own in which assimilation or extermination become plausible solutions, credible policies. Under such circumstances, one longs for the sure bet, a predictable unfolding of events, or at least a comforting conclusion. “At this stage of the game” (as Schwartzkopf said in the midst of GW1), I have none, because the currently designed game, to rid the world of evil, cannot possibly find an end. Inevitably, what Edmund Burke called the empire of circumstance will surely, and let us hope not too belatedly, trump Bush’s imperial game as well as Bin Laden’s terrorist one. When tempted in the interim by the promise of virtuous war to solve the world’s problems, we best listen to the great Yogi: “If the world were perfect, it wouldn’t be.”

Second, the divorcing of trauma from war allows killing without responsibility—this is the root of the genocidal mindset

Der Derian, 2000 (James, Prof. of IR @ UMass – Amherst and Brown University, “Virtuous War/Virtual Theory,” International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 4 (Oct., 2000), pp. 771-788, JSTOR)

In a sense, war has always been a virtual reality, too traumatic for immediate comprehension. Trauma, Freud tells us, can be re-enacted, even re-experienced, but cannot be understood at the moment of shock. This is what Michael Herr was getting at in Dispatches, when he wrote about his experiences in Vietnam: 'It took the war to teach it, that you were as responsible for everything you saw as you were for everything you did. The problem was that you didn't always know what you were seeing until later, maybe years later, that a lot of it never made it in at all, it just stayed stored there in your eyes'.2 But now there is an added danger, a further distancing of understanding. When compared to the real trauma of war, the pseudo-trauma of simulation pales. But an insidious threat emerges from its shadowing of reality. In this high-tech rehearsal for war, one learns how to kill but not to take responsibility for it, one experiences 'death' but not the tragic consequences of it. In the extreme case, with the predisposed pathologies of a Milosevic in Serbia, a McVeigh in Oklahoma City, or a Harris in Littleton, Colorado, this can lead to a kind of doubling or splitting of the self that psychologists Robert Jay Lifton and Erik Markusen see as a source of the 'genocidal mentality'. But what I have witnessed is more a closing than an opening of a schism, between how we see and live, represent and experience, simulate and fight war. New technologies of imitation and simulation as well as surveillance and speed have collapsed the geographical distance, chronological duration, the gap itself between the reality and virtuality of war. As the confusion of one for the other grows, we now face the danger of a new kind of trauma without sight, drama without tragedy, where television wars and video war games blur together.

Our alternative is to reject the aff in favor of reformed constructivism—only a co-opted constructivist viewpoint can critique virtual theory and explain international events

Der Derian, 2000 (James, Prof. of IR @ UMass – Amherst and Brown University, “Virtuous War/Virtual Theory,” International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 4 (Oct., 2000), pp. 771-788, JSTOR)

On the epistemological spectrum, this clearly places the virtualists nearer to the constructivists than the rationalists or realists. Virtual theory repudiates the philosophical realism and positivism underlying most social science theory, where words transparently mirror objects, facts reside apart from values, and theory is independent of the reality that it represents.'3 Yet, I have found little of intellectual or pragmatic utility in the metatheoretical, structuralist, and curiously amorphous forms (again, where are the bodies/agents?) that constructivism has taken in International Relations. To me it is a step backwards, from structuralism to bloburalism, to invoke that classic of the I950s, 'The Blob', where misunderstood teenagers (something of a stretch for the star, Steve McQueen) took on an extra-terrestrial gooey blob that had emerged from a meteor. In spite of efforts to destroy it by conventional means (i.e. lots of firepower), it grows to gargantuan proportions by parasitically sucking the life out of humans. This might be something of a dramatic exaggeration, but some hyperbole might be warranted, if we are not to awake one day in the future, to find where once regime theorists ruled, critical theorists critiqued, standpoint feminists stood, epistemic communities communed, and post-structuralists problematized, only a protoplasmic trace remains. Not even the 'English school' of international theory appears to have raised the Oxbridge in time against the constructivist onslaught. Only neo-realists and neo-liberals, occupying the higher reaches of the discipline, protected by positivism from non-observable phenomena like the Blob, have so far escaped its saprophytic attack. Constructivism in International Relations has demonstrated a remarkable capability to absorb any approach that privileges epistemology over methodology, identity over interest, relativism over rationalism, social facts over empirical data. To be fair, there are less metaphorical, not quite so philosophically obtuse, more practical reasons for the growth of constructivism. It can be attributed to the quality of its scholarship, the proselytizing energy of its proponents, as well as the strategic if somewhat compromising position it strives to occupy between other 'post-modem', 'rigid', 'hardcore', 'radical' or 'strong' approaches.'4 It could be argued that constructivism is spreading because it provides new and valuable concepts for interpreting a rapidly changing world that older approaches in IR have not, and perhaps cannot provide.'5 Indeed, it could be argued that argumentation itself, now thriving in the increasingly pluralistic and fragmented subfields of IR and schools of the social sciences, favours constructivism, which at least theoretically practises (a pragmatic evaluation of competing truth-claims) what it preaches (the world is what we make of it).i6 How, then, to link virtual theory to constructivism without falling prey to its blob-like qualities? There is the conventional approach, that would rest constructivist claims with precise definitions, comparative literature reviews, theoretical analysis, and the reductionist diagram viz., the kind of professional activity that keeps us all busy and our journals in business. Following economic models, this primitive accumulation of knowledge might well result in a great leap forward to a new stage of intellectual development in International Relations. However, progress in history, as well as discontinuous, epistemic innovation in science, rarely takes the linear path of incrementalism. A less direct critique might be more effective. It need not be on the order of past polemics, like Hedley Bull's infamous frontal assault on behaviouralists, which, we should remember, was spurred by his belief that one should 'study their position until one could state their own arguments better than they could and then-when they were least suspecting-to turn on them and slaughter them in an academic massacre of Glencoe'.17 Given the nature of the beast, it might be more appropriate to play down the minor differences, to mimic constructivism, say, as predators do their prey, and co-opt it from without. As Steve McQueen discovered the hard way, Blobs are pretty much immune to flaming or caging: direct confrontation is just more thought for food. Not wishing to escalate to the thermonuclear level (as they did, counter-productively, in the sequel, 'Beware the Blob!'), I suggest a different strategy for the de-blobbing of constructivism, one that is empirical, historical, and political, which refigures constructivism as a progenitor rather than pre-empter of virtual theory.

# 3th

**Natural gas demand is rebounding**

**Bentek 12** (Bentek Energy news website, “Natural Gas Demand: Waking the Sleeping Giant,” copyright 2012, <http://www.bentekenergy.com/fcsnaturalgasdemand.aspx>) KJs

The U.S. natural gas market is facing slightly greater upside price risk through 2016 because of natural gas demand growth. While low drilling costs and high oil prices are expected to maintain strong gas supply growth, potentially leading to pipeline and storage operational constraints this fall, signs of stronger demand over the longer term have started to emerge. Due to substantial incentives to burn more natural gas BENTEK believes switching to gas will only increase in the residential, commercial, industrial and power sectors. The base-case forecasts currently are conservative, totaling about 4.0 Bcf/d of total gas demand growth through 2016, but there is a high risk that demand will grow even faster.

**Plan tradesoff with natural gas**

Brown 12 (Marilyn A. Brown\* Etan Gumerman† Xiaojing Sun\* Gyungwon Kim\* Kenneth Sercy†, \*School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology †Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, Duke University. “Myths and Facts about Electricity in the U.S. South, This report was printed in the journal Energy Policy in January 2012, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421511007518>) KJS

Our SNUG-NEMS analysis indicates that even with strong policies to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy, fossil fuel generation would continue to expand in the next twenty years, though at a slower pace relative to the Reference scenario. Widespread deployment of energy efficiency measures would displace 32 billion kWh natural gas generation in 2030, and if coupled with renewable energy policies, together they would retire over 80 billion kWh of natural gas generation (Figure 5). However, in these scenarios, electric generation from coal and total CO2 emissions continue to grow (Figure 5 & 6). We conclude that renewable and efficiency policies can reduce fossil demand growth and displace existing natural gas generation, but cost-effective policies alone will not displace existing coal generation.

**That solves warming**

Hill 12 (Joshua, writer for Clean Technia.com, “New Study: Natural Gas is a Smart Move in Battle Against Global Warming,… But Is It Really?,” July 12, 2012, <http://cleantechnica.com/2012/07/12/new-study-natural-gas-is-a-smart-move-in-battle-against-global-warming-but-is-it-really/>) KJS

The future may indeed be a combination of wind, solar, and nuclear power, but according to Cornell Professor Lawrence M. Cathles, using natural gas as an energy source is going to be vital as an intermediary step on that road, and will prove imperative in the battle against climate change. Cathles reached this conclusion after reviewing the most recent government and industry data on natural gas “leakage rates” during extraction, as well as recently developed climate models. His research was published in the most recent edition of the journal Geochemistry, Geophysics and Geosystems. Cathles is a faculty member in Cornell’s Department of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences. No matter the time frame considered, he concluded, substituting natural gas energy for all coal production and some oil production provides about 40 percent of the global warming benefit that a complete switch to low-carbon sources would deliver, making this a good intermediary step.

**Extinction**

**IANS, 10**

(6/19, Indo-Asian News Service, citing Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, professor at University of Queensland and Director of the Global Change Institute, and John Bruno, associate professor of Marine Science at UNC, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/sci-tech/could-unbridled-climate-changes-lead-to-human-extinction\_100382787.html

Sydney: Scientists have sounded alarm bells about how growing concentrations of greenhouse gases are driving irreversible and dramatic changes in the way the oceans function, providing evidence that humankind could well be on the way to the next great extinction. The findings of the comprehensive report: 'The impact of climate change on the world's marine ecosystems' emerged from a synthesis of recent research on the world's oceans, carried out by two of the world's leading marine scientists. One of the authors of the report is Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, professor at The University of Queensland and the director of its Global Change Institute (GCI). 'We may see sudden, unexpected changes that have serious ramifications for the overall well-being of humans, including the capacity of the planet to support people. This is further evidence that we are well on the way to the next great extinction event,' says Hoegh-Guldberg. 'The findings have enormous implications for mankind, particularly if the trend continues. The earth's ocean, which produces half of the oxygen we breathe and absorbs 30 per cent of human-generated carbon dioxide, is equivalent to its heart and lungs. This study shows worrying signs of ill-health. It's as if the earth has been smoking two packs of cigarettes a day!,' he added. 'We are entering a period in which the ocean services upon which humanity depends are undergoing massive change and in some cases beginning to fail', he added. The 'fundamental and comprehensive' changes to marine life identified in the report include rapidly warming and acidifying oceans, changes in water circulation and expansion of dead zones within the ocean depths. These are driving major changes in marine ecosystems: less abundant coral reefs, sea grasses and mangroves (important fish nurseries); fewer, smaller fish; a breakdown in food chains; changes in the distribution of marine life; and more frequent diseases and pests among marine organisms. Study co-author John F Bruno, associate professor in marine science at The University of North Carolina, says greenhouse gas emissions are modifying many physical and geochemical aspects of the planet's oceans, in ways 'unprecedented in nearly a million years'. 'This is causing fundamental and comprehensive changes to the way marine ecosystems function,' Bruno warned, according to a GCI release.

# Trade Adv

**Trade wars won’t occur**

**Ziemba ‘9** (The Re-Emergence of Global Protectionism: A Newer Version of Smoot-Hawley?

Rachel Ziemba | Mar 4, 2009

However, the **probability of these measures becoming significant** enough to lead to a trade war like the 1930s might be low given that **counties understand that retaliation effects will counter-productive** for domestic growth and jobs. Moreover, **the WTO surveillance mechanism, absent during the 1930s,** will help countries go to the WTO court if they face import barriers **and thus prevent trade wars.**

**No US-China war – regional stability**

**Ackerman 11**– quoting former admiral Timothy Keating, the official blog of the Armed Forces Communication and Electronics Association

(Robert, 5/10/11, War Between China, U.S. Not Likely, http://www.afcea.org/signal/signalscape/index.php/2011/05/10/11510/)

The United States and China are not likely to go to war with each other because neither country wants it and it would run counter to both nations’ best interests. That was the conclusion of a plenary panel session hosted by former Good Morning America host David Hartman at the 2011 Joint Warfighting Conference in Virginia Beach. Adm. Timothy J. Keating, USN (Ret.), former head of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted that China actually wants the United States to remain active in the Asia-Pacific region as a hedge against any other country’s adventurism. And, most of the other countries in that region want the United States to remain active as a hedge against China. Among areas of concern for China is North Korea. Wallace “Chip” Gregson, former assistant secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, said that above all China fears instability, and a North Korean collapse or war could send millions of refugees streaming into Manchuria, which has economic problems of its own. As for Taiwan, Adm. Keating offered that with each day, the likelihood of a Chinese attack on Taiwan diminishes. Economic ties between the two governments are growing, as is social interaction. He predicts that a gradual solution to reunification is coming. The United States can hasten that process by remaining a powerful force in the region, he added.

**Scarcity doesn’t cause conflict.**

**Salehyan 7** assistant professor of political science at the University of North Texas

[Idean Salehyan, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, August 2007, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922>]

First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.

**Economic collapse doesn’t lead to war – empirics prove**

Ferguson 2006, - MA, PHD, the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University, resident faculty member of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Senior Reseach Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford University, and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University

(Niall, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

# Scarcity Adv

**No Indo-Pak war**

**Starobin ’06** [Paul, National Journal, May 19, “Of Mullahs and Madness,” online]

This would amount to a kind of regional deterrence system -- the approximate parallel would be India-Pakistan, both of which gained the bomb in 1998. Having fought three major wars before then, the first in 1947-48, those two nations have not waged a big one since, and they have regular, if sometimes heated communications. Lacking a land border, which in the India-Pakistan case has helped keep the pot simmering, Israel and Iran arguably would find it easier to maintain a cold stalemate, argues Leon Hadar, a native Israeli and a former U.N. bureau chief for The Jerusalem Post who is the author of [Sandstorm](http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1403967245/nationaljournalc), a 2005 book on the security climate in the Middle East. Hadar is currently a research fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington.

**Empirically, water doesn’t cause war**

**Lawfield 10** – Thomas Lawfield is an MA candidate at the University for Peace. Water Security: War or Peace? Thomas Lawfield May 03, 2010 http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id\_article=715

In reality, water does not cause war. The arguments presented above, although correct in principle, have little purchase in empirical evidence. Indeed, as one author notes, there is only one case of a war where the formal declaration of war was over water.[20] This was an incident between two Mesopotamian city states, Lagash and Umma, over 2,500 years BC, in modern day southern Iraq. Both the initial premises and arguments of water war theorists have been brought into question. Given this, a number of areas of contestation have emerged: "Questioning both the supply and demand side of the water war argument [...] Questioning assumptions about the costs of water resources [...and] Demonstrating the cooperative potential of the water resource."[21] Why then is water not a cause of war? The answer lies in two factors: first, the capacity for adaptation to water stresses and, second, the political drawbacks to coupling water and conflict. First, there is no water crisis, or more correctly, there are a number of adaptation strategies that reduce stress on water resources and so make conflict less likely. Unlike the water war discourse, which perceives water as finite in the Malthusian sense, the capacity for adaptation to water stress has been greatly underestimated. For instance, I will discuss in particular a trading adaptation known as ‘virtual water’, which refers to the water used to grow imported food. This water can be subtracted from the total projected agricultural water needs of a state, and hence allows water scarce states to operate on a lower in-country water requirement than would otherwise be expected.[22] This means that regions of the world that are particularly rich in water produce water intense agricultural products more easily in the global trade system, while other water scarce areas produce low intensity products.[23] The scale of this water is significant - Allan famously pointed out that more embedded water flows into the Middle East in the form of grain than flows in the Nile.[24] In addition, there are significant problems around the hegemonic doctrine of the water crisis. Many authors point to relatively low water provision per capita by states, and suggest that this will increase the likelihood of a state engaging in war with a neighbouring state, to obtain the water necessary for its population. This is normally a conceptual leap that produces the incorrect corollary of conflict, but is also frequently a problem of data weaknesses around the per capita requirements. For instance, Stucki cites the case of the Palestinians being under the worst water stress, with a per capita provision being in the region of 165m³/year.[25] Unfortunately, such an analysis is based on false actual provision data in this region. Based on the authors work on water provision in Lebanese Palestinian refugee camps, the actual provision is over 90m³/month. Such a figure is highly likely to be representative of other camps in the region.[26] If this example is representative of trends to exaggerate water pressures in the region, then we should be sceptical about claims of increasing water stress. Furthermore, given that many water systems have a pipe leakage rate of fifty per cent, combined with a seventy per cent loss of agricultural water, significant efficiency enhancements could be made to existing infrastructure. Combined with desalination options in many water shortage prone states, there is an overall capacity for technological and market driven solutions to water scarcity.[27]

**\*\*\*2NC**

**China Econ**

**Chinese economy is not due for a hard landing**

**Trevethan 11** – Reuters correspondent

(Nick, June 20, Reuters, “Analysis: Resource firms bet on China boom, not Roubini gloom”, <http://ca.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idCATRE75J14G20110620?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0>) RA

But other analysts argued that China's immense urbanization program meant that although some infrastructure may be under utilized at present, it would find customers in the years to come. "You don't build infrastructure expecting to run at capacity on day one. You build based on future demand. The other question you need to ask is what is a hard landing for an economy growing at 10 percent?" said a bank analyst in Shanghai, not authorized to speak to the media. "Is it a slowdown to 5 percent? Even that implies, assuming demand for commodities rises in line with GDP, an additional 400,000 tonnes of copper or more than 30 million tonnes of iron ore. China is about 'boomsday'. The risk of 'gloomsday', let alone doomsday, is slim." Since 2007, China's GDP has grown by just under 10 percent on average each year, while copper demand has increased by an average of 25 percent annually and iron ore by 16 percent. "Remember when you build a factory in China to make cars, you also have to build homes for the workers, hospitals, schools, shops and other infrastructure. All that adds to the intensity of commodity consumption, and that won't end for some time," the analyst said. Already almost half of China's 1.34 billion population live in cities and towns, according to a census in April, up from 36.1 percent in 2000, although the previous census used a different counting method. If that trend continues, over the next ten years around 200 million more Chinese rural inhabitants -- two thirds of the population of the entire United States -- will need housing, workplaces and household goods. "Some of these analysts take traditional free market supply-demand techniques and try to apply them to a socialist market economy. It just doesn't work," said Jonathan Barratt, managing director of Commodity Broking Services in Sydney. "The massive amounts of infrastructure just to keep up with population growth even as it slows will mean any dip will be well supported."

**2NC Overview**

**The threats they identify become self-fulfilling prophecies—security is merely socially constructed**

**Lipschutz**, Director of Adlai Stevenson Propgram on Global Seecurity, **1995** [Ronnie,*On Security*, p.10]

Security is, to put Waever’s argument in other words, a *socially constructed* concept: It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context.18 It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them.19 To be sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a not-insignificant extent, out of the specific historical and social context of a particular country and some understanding of what is “out there.”20 But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of “objective” reality independent of these constructions.21 That security is a socially constructed does not mean that there are not to be found real, material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threats, or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or undermining the assumptions underlying security policy. Enemies, in part, “create” each other, via the projections of their worst fears onto the other; in this respect, their relationship is intersubjective. To the extent that they act on these projections, threats to each other acquire a material character. In other words, nuclear-tipped ICBMs are not mere figments of our imagination, but their targeting is a function of what we imagine the possessors of other missiles might do to us with *theirs*.22

**The identification of threats is controlled by the state and elites who will use them for their own goals—there are no objective harms**

**Waever**, Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen, **1998** [Oli, Chapter 3 of *On Security*, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz]

Reading the theoretical literature on security, one is often left without a good answer to a simple question: What really makes something a security problem? As I have suggested above, security problems are developments that threaten the sovereignty or independence of a states in a particularly rapid or dramatic fashion, and deprive it of the capacity to manage itself. This, in turn, undercuts the political order. Such a threat must therefore be met with the mobilization of the maximum effort. Operationally, however, this means: *In naming a certain development a security problem, the “state” can claim a special right*, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites. Trying to press the kind of unwanted fundamental political change on a ruling elite is similar to playing a game in which one’s opponent can change the rules at any time s/he likes. Power holders can always try to use the instrument of *securitization* of an issue to gain control over it. By definition, something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so: And because the End of this Insitution [the Leviathan, the Sovereign], is the Peace and Defense of them all; and whoever has the right to the End, has the right to the Means; it belongeth of Right to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defense; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by the prevention of Discord at home and hostility from abroad; and. When Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same.22 Thus, that those who administer this order can easily use it for specific, self-serving purposes is something that cannot easily be avoided.

**2NC Framework**

**Simulation must be evaluated first and moots everything in their framework—nothing exists outside of the simulation itself**

**Der Derian, 1990** (James, Prof. of IR @ UMass – Amherst and Brown University, “The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and Speed,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, Special Issue: Speaking the Language ofExile: Dissidence in International Studies (Sep., 1990), pp. 295-310, JSTOR)

The object of this inquiry is not to conduct an internal critique of the simulation industry, nor to claim some privileged grounds for disproving its conclusions.'4 Rather, the intent is to show how, in the construction of a realm of meaning that has minimal contact with historically specific events or actors, simulations have demonstrated the power to displace the "reality" of international relations they purport to represent. Simulations have created a new space in international relations where actors act, things happen, and the consequences have no origins except the artificial cyberspace of the simulations themselves.

**We’re scholars, not policymakers—our plan texts don’t affect anything but the way we depict the world informs policy discussions**

**Edkins and Zehfuss**, Politics Professor at the University of Wales Aberystwyth and Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Warwick, **2005** [Jenny and Maja, *Generalising the International*, Review of International Studies 31, 451-472]

What we are attempting in this article is an intervention that demonstrates how the illusion of the sovereign state in an insecure and anarchic international system is sustained and how it might be challenged. It seems to us that this has become important in the present circumstances. The focus on security and the dilemma of security versus freedom that is set out in debates immediately after September 11th presents an apparent choice as the focus for dissent, while concealing the extent to which thinking is thereby confined to a specific agenda. Our argument will be that this approach relies on a particular picture of the political world that has been reflected within the discipline of international relations, a picture of a world of sovereign states. We have a responsibility as scholars; we are not insulated from the policy world. What we discuss may not, and indeed does not, have a direct impact on what happens in the policy world, this is clear, but our writings and our teaching do have an input in terms of the creation and reproduction of pictures of the world that inform colic and set the contours of policy debates. Moreover, the discipline within which we are situated is one which depends itself on a particular view of the world - a view that sees the international as a realm of politics distinct from the domestic - the same view of the world as the one that underpins thinking on security and defense in the US administration. In this article then we develop an analysis of the ways in which thinking in terms of international relations and a system of states forecloses certain possibilities from the start, and how it might look to think about politics and the international differently. Our chosen point of intervention is to examine how IR thinking works; by showing how this thinking operates, and how it relies on certain analytical moves and particular categorisations and dichotomies, we hope to demonstrate that it is not the only way that world politics could be thought through. Identifying the underpinnings of existing frameworks is an important preliminary before new thinking can be full effective and is itself a first move hi dislodging these underpinnings. We have chosen to base our analysis on the work of Hedley Bull. This is for several reasons. First, Bull acknowledges in the preface to The Anarchical Society that he owes a profound debt to Martin Wight, who first demonstrated that international Relations could be made a subject'. We take Bull then as an example of someone who was attempting to establish `International Relations' as an academic discipline, and thus as an appropriate starting point in our attempt to `disestablish' it. Second, Bull provides an example of a theorist of international relations who sets out his position in a way that makes the underlying logic clear and thus available for analysis. He is well aware of the way in which it is necessary to neglect certain aspects of world politics in order to produce `International Relations' and is quite explicit in general about the moves he makes in order to do this. Bull's logic involves the types of impossible dilemmas and contradictions that we have located in current thinking about terrorism and vulnerability. In particular he discusses the relationship between order and justice, as two fundamental principles of international relations, and then sets aside the question of justice in order to focus on order. This is the third reason for focusing on his work. There are important parallels to be made between `order' as it appears in Bull and `security' in debates after September 11th. We tease out the implications of our reading of Bull's Anarchical Society and propose that what we call generalising the international could lead to an alternative analysis of world politics, one that did not replace politics with security or justice with order.

**2NC Link Wall/Turns Case**

**The kritik turns the entire case—**

**The clean kill—they sanitize nuclear war by depicting its violence without coming close to experiencing it—this makes their impacts inevitable by desensitizing us to their effects**

**Externally, this makes more wars inevitable**

**Carruthers, 2001** – Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth (Susan L., “New Media, New War,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 77, No. 3,Changing Patterns of European Security and Defence (Jul., 2001), pp. 673-681, JSTOR)

This essay seeks to draw out key strands in recent discussions over the apparent 'virtualization' of war. In particular, it questions the vaunted 'disembodiment' of violence in the digital age, from which injury has seemingly disappeared, along with enemies and civilian capacity to tolerate casualties. It suggests that we need properly to historicize phenomena whose rootedness in the representational practices of war-and in modernity itself-can be too easily underestimated by overstating both the newness of'new media' and 'new war' alike. What defines 'the virtual'? For both Paul Virilio and James Der Derian, confusion between the real and the hyperreal, the world of the palpable and of the representational-might appear the defining character of war in the age of simulation, a confusion they mimic, as war games meet word games. Der Derian's 'road trip into the cyborg heart of the military-industrial-media-entertainment network' is dizzying less for the 'warp-speed' we're promised than for the looping route that results when one travels without maps but lets Baudrillard, Virilio and Deleuze take the wheel. Already road-tested on the readers of Internationa Affairs, Der Derian's new volume is likely to infuriate those whom it does not illuminate, leaving 'vampire-hearted' realists and postdated post-modernists alike to eat dust.2 In Virtuous war we find the IR theorist as war-game tourist, simultaneously seeking illumination of war's future and of its toll on the author's past. Travelling from one 'unreal' locale to another-war-gaming in the Mojave desert, simulated urban anarchy in the San Francisco Bay, with a brief stopover on the 'outer reaches of Aberystwyth' en route-Der Derian interviews a diverse cast of characters (from Wesley Clark to Virilio himself) and muses over many unsettling convergences. In an era when entertainment has become the continuation of politics by other means-when Hollywood pre-scripts foreign policy, its stars adding glamour and subtracting gravitas from electoral conventions-it is only fitting (however unsettling) that Disney animates wars of the future. Digitized, computer-generated simulations anticipate, and possibly even precipitate, the scenarios of 'real war'. (In July I990, 'Exercise Internal Look '90' rehearsed a militarized response to an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait only days before its fictive scenario was re-enacted 'for real' [pp.I516].) Yet 'real war'-witnessed by its combatants and spectators alike through missile-mounted video in real time-appears indistinguishable from the simulation. Indeed, conducted in the name of humanitarianism, the new violence makes a virtue of its apparent bloodlessness. The virtual flaunts its virtuousness, boasting 'the technical capability and ethical imperative to threaten and, if necessary, actualise violence from a distance-with no or minimal casualties'( p. xv). What, after all, could be more just than a clean war?

**Hyperreality—they collapse simulation and reality until we can’t tell them apart—when simulation precedes reality representational boundaries break down and nuclear war results—MAD logic makes sense in a world where we’re driven by war gaming**

**Der Derian, 1990** (James, Prof. of IR @ UMass – Amherst and Brown University, “The Simulation Syndrome: From War Games to Game Wars,” Social Text No. 24 1990 Duke University Press)

My purpose, however, is not simply to give notice of the computer diffusion of war games. Nor is it to claim that a pervasive militarization of society is likely to result. That might be a possibility, but there is a more complex if less obvious danger that deserves our attention. The proliferation of simulations into all walks of life - as news (re)creations, video games, flight simulators, police interrogations, and war plans - has weakened and in some cases **displaced** the representational boundary between the simulation and the "real thing'. We all have some notion of the reality of war, but just what is its simulation? It could be broadly defined as the continuation of war by means of verisimilitude. Conventionally, a "**war game'** uses broad descriptive strokes and a minimum of mathematical abstraction to make generalizations about the behavior of actors, while the "simulation' uses algorithms and computer power to analyze the amount of technical detail considered necessary to predict events and the behavior of actors. Judging by the gradual shift by the military and think-tanks from games to mainly computerized simulations - reflected in the shift of the Joint Chiefs of Staff gaming organization from SAGA (Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency) to JAD (Joint Analysis Directorate) - it would seem that simulation is becoming the preferred, "sponge' term. "Simulation' also has the obvious advantage of sounding more serious than "gaming, and of carrying more of a high-tech, scientific connotation than modeling. Driven by the goal of total authenticity and rendered by new scientific methods of reproduction, the war simulation is leading us into a brave new world. The writer J.L. Borges anticipated this realm in his fable about the cartographers who when ordered by the emperor to draw the perfect map of the empire created one that exactly and entirely covered the territory. The social critic Jean Baudrillard recounts this story to make a telling point: we now have the technical means to make maps and models that seem as real as the reality that they simulate. "Virtual' or "artificial' reality is what the computer scientists are calling it. Baudrillard refers to it as the realm of hyperreality, where origins are forgotten, referents lost, and simulations begin to precede and engender reality. This is the world of Mutual Assured Destruction, Star Wars, and Stealth Technology, all of them deterrence machines that most persuasively "work' in the hyperreal world of strategic simulation (a point brought home by the botched bombing of the Panamanian military barracks by a stealth FB-117).

**Virilio—the “speeding up” of political space represented by simulation makes their attempt at political progress impossible by voiding the notions of space and time**

**Hanes, 1996** – Department of Philosophy, Fordham University (Marc, “Paul Virilio and the Articulation of Post-Reality,” Human Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), pp. 185-197, JSTOR)

His basic insight finds that the conceptual dimensions of time and space have become fundamentally destabilized due to modern technology's strategic urge to produce better results and more complete knowledge at an increasingly faster pace. Technology's architectonic structure reaches virtual totalization, swallowing both time and space (that is, if one can move fast enough one is concurrently everywhere bringing about a speed-induced/flux so far-reaching and totalizing as to be static). Speed allows the power of the real, a fixed location in time and space, to disappear. "Speed suddenly becomes a primal dimension that defies all temporal and physical measurements" (1991 b: 18). The real, the point in time and space, is replaced by the "reality effect," the vector hanging in no-time, no-space ready to follow (more so, to be) any possible trajectory. That is, speed makes potentiality or possibility actuality—what may come about or appear is given equal standing to what does appear. At every level, social, political, or military, speed has resulted in what Virilio calls "dromological" violence,1 which does not allow for a time or place to appear in which this trend could then be evaluated and questioned. While at first this observation may strike one as an essentially modernist complaint against the standard-less aporia of postmodernity, Virilio intends it otherwise. Modern progress has not been defeated by its relativist enemies: progress has destroyed itself by fulfilling its goal only too well, i.e., by improving its technological abilities until those abilities went beyond any effective control. He writes: "It is speed as the nature of dromological progress that ruins progress... .Western man has appeared superior and dominant, despite inferior demographics, because he appeared more rapid'' (1986: 46-7). That is, when speed voids time and space, any Western-style notion of progress becomes impossible to situate positive movement suffers from a type of regenerative obsolescence in which the novel never even has its day to shine since speed renders it superfluous even before its very occurrence. Thus, while the appearance of improvement may be maintained constantly, without actual instantiation the superiority of the technological West remains at a hypothetical or theoretical level. For example, Virilio would point to the economic shifts which threaten the 'American dream' such as the replacement of corporate middle managers with swift, efficient computers. The system has 'improved' but those it was designed to serve and benefit have been devastated or ruined by this 'advance.' And the survivors work longer hours with less leisure time than the workers of previously less advanced stages.

**They Say “Permutation---Do Both”**

**Synthesis is impossible—we have to instead send theory off in crazy directions—rationalism will always ignore our radical critique**

**Der Derian, 1990** (James, Prof. of IR @ UMass – Amherst and Brown University, “The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and Speed,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, Special Issue: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies (Sep., 1990), pp. 295-310, JSTOR)

I have reflected on Keohane's well-traveled road. I have weighed its quite reason- able rules against the historical evidence, the international events born out of both accidental (famine, flood, earthquake) and intentional (war, terrorism, genocide) disasters that have taken place on this road. I have considered Keohane's destination, the higher "normative grounds" of "international cooperation," and found it to be laudable, and indeed shared by many of the reflective routes. But his conclusion makes the unbeaten track seem more appealing if not necessary: it is not in synthesis but by learning to live with irreconcilable differences and multiple identities-in high theory and in everyday practices-that we might find our best hope for international relations. I think here Keohane might agree: unless we are willing now and then to head the big American car of international relations theory off in untried, untestable, even unreasonable directions, the only perpetual peace-to update Kant-will be that of the roadside kill.' This essay is not a polemic against Keohane's rationalist institutionalism, nor is it a theoretical defense of post-structuralism. They are no longer needed, for each side has begun to recognize the legitimacy of the dialogue if not the epistemological claims of the other.2 Judging, however, from critical comments that have arisen as much from confusion as from disagreement, a few prefatory points are in order about some differences between rationalists and poststructuralists that resist synthesis. First, post-structuralism is a semio-critical activity, ever searching for and seeking to dismantle the empirico-rational positions where power fixes meaning.3 Second, post- structuralism does not hold that reflectivists or rationalists reflect the field of international relations. Both use and are used by language, by the tropes, rhetoric, narratives and grammar that make up an array of ambiguous and indeterminate signifying practices. It is this heterological nature of discourse that dominant powers, in a demonstrative, hegemonic act, always dream of fixing, reducing, subjecting to a single, monological meaning. Third, the rationalists demonstrate this power play when they construct a transcendental, privileged space to make truth-claims about international relations (like those made by game and rational choice theory from the supposed high-point of scientific progress). Alternatively-and Keohane deserves credit for now making it less of an alternative-the rationalists might simply ignore the problem of discourse, in the vain hope that it will ignore them. But the poststructuralists are always aware of-and always irritating others by demonstrating-the stickiness of the web of meaning.

**Can’t solve—realist thinking is incompatible with our alternative and will always marginalize it—new modes of understanding are key**

**Der Derian, 1999** (James, Prof. of IR @ UMass – Amherst and Brown University, “A Virtual Theory of Global Politics, Mimetic War and the Spectral State,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 93 (MARCH 24-27, 1999), pp. 163-176, JSTOR)

The spatialist, materialist, that is, realist, bias of thinking in international theory renders it inadequate for a critical inquiry into the temporal, representational, deterritorial and potentially dangerous powers of virtual technologies. Semiotic, critical and discourse theories offer a better perspective, having led the way in tracing the reconfiguration of power into new representational, immaterial forms. They have helped us to understand how acts of inscription and the production of information can reify consciousness, float signifiers and render concepts undecidable. However, as the realities of international politics increasingly are generated, mediated and simulated by successive technical means of reproduction, there is not so much a distancing from some original, truth-bearing source as there is an implosion, in which meaning disappears into a media black hole of insignificance. As the globalization and virtualization of new media sunder meaning from conventional moorings, and set information adrift as it moves with alacrity and celerity from phenomenal to virtual forms, one searches for new modes of understanding.

**They Say “Permutation---Do Plan and Alt”**

**Virtuality means that representations are inevitable – war simulations are spreading globally now – ceding the representational sphere allows bad representations to dominate.**

Der Derian, 2000 (James, Prof. of IR @ UMass – Amherst and Brown University, “Virtuous War/Virtual Theory,” International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 4 (Oct., 2000), pp. 771-788, JSTOR)

Clearly, the problem of representation is compounded when the foxhole itself goes virtual. The nature of war is mutating, morphing, virtualizing with new technologies and strategies. New media, generally identified as digitized, interactive, networked forms of communication, now exercise a global effect if not ubiquitous presence through real time access. Moreover, with the magnification and dramatization of old ailments like nationalism, balkanization, and civil war by new media, virtuous war reaches not only into every living room but splashes onto every screen, TV, computer and cinema. People will live and die, figuratively and literally, by the power of images, previewed by the famine child that drew American troops into Somalia, and of the dead US Ranger dragged through the streets that hastened their departure.

**They Say “Realism Inevitable”**

**Inevitability is a link, not a turn—saying “realism inevitable” avoids responsibility and is subtly prescriptive rather than descriptive—the impact is ignoring massive human suffering**

**Kraig, 2002** – Prof. of Communications @ University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee (Robert Alexander, “The Tragic Science: The Uses of Jimmy Carter in Foreign Policy Realism,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 5.1, Project Muse)

Given the claimed inevitability of realism's description of international politics, one might think that nations need not look to expert guidance because power interests will inevitably determine governmental policy. But the realists, while embracing determinism, simultaneously argue that human nature is repeatedly violated. One traditional claim has been that America, because of its unique history, has been ever in danger of ignoring the dictates of the foreign policy scene. This argument is offered by Henry Kissinger in his avowedly Morgenthauian work Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. 21 Realists also argue that there are idealists in all human societies who refuse to see the reality of power. As Richard W. Cottam, a trenchant critic of orthodox realism, explained the argument: "Every era has its incorrigible idealists who persist in seeing evil man as good. When they somehow gain power and seek to put their ideas into effect, Machiavellians who understand man's true nature appear and are more than willing and more than capable of exploiting this eternal naivete." 22 Cottam was referring to one of the central ideological constructs of international relations theory—the realist/idealist dichotomy. First explicated in detail by Morgenthau in his Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 23 this dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who dare to consider transcending or transforming established patterns of global competition. This construct is enriched by the narratives of failed idealists—most prominently Tsar Alexander the First, Woodrow Wilson, Neville Chamberlain, and Jimmy Carter—men who, despite and in fact because of their good intentions, caused untold human suffering. After World War II, realists built their conception of leadership on a negative caricature of Woodrow Wilson. 24 As George Kennan, one of the primary architects of Cold War policy, warned in 1945: "If we insist at this moment in our history in wandering about with our heads in the clouds of Wilsonean idealism . . . we run the risk of losing even that bare minimum of security which would be assured to us by the maintenance of humane, stable, and cooperative forms of society on the immediate European shores of the Atlantic." 25 Wilson's supposed idealism was said by the emerging realist scholars to have led to the unstable international political structure that caused World War II [End Page 6] and now threatened the postwar balance of forces. Despite convincing refutations by the leading historians of Wilson's presidency, most recently John Milton Cooper Jr. in his definitive study of the League of Nations controversy, realists continue to caricature Wilson as a fuzzy-headed idealist. 26 Idealists, in realist writings, all share a fatal flaw: an inability to comprehend the realities of power. They live in a world of unreality, responding to nonexistent scenes. As Riker put it, "Unquestionably, there are guilt-ridden and shame-conscious men who do not desire to win, who in fact desire to lose. These are irrational ones in politics." 27 It is here that the realist expert comes in. It is assumed that strategic doctrine can be rationally and objectively established. According to Kissinger, a theorist who later became a leading practitioner, "it is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy." The science of international relations claims the capacity to chart the foreign policy scene and then establish the ends and means of national policy. This objective order can only be revealed by rational and dispassionate investigators who are well-schooled in the constraints and possibilities of power politics. Realism's scenic character makes it a radically empirical science. As Morgenthau put it, the political realist "believes in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only subjective judgement." Avowedly modernist in orientation, realism claims to be rooted not in a theory of how international relations ought to work, but in a privileged reading of a necessary and predetermined foreign policy environment. 28 In its orthodox form political realism assumes that international politics are and must be dominated by the will to power. Moral aspirations in the international arena are merely protective coloration and propaganda or the illusions that move hopeless idealists. What is most revealing about this assessment of human nature is not its negativity but its fatalism. There is little if any place for human moral evolution or perfectibility. Like environmental determinism—most notably the social darwinism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—political realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved upon. From the stationary perspective of social scientific realism in its pure form, the fatal environment of human social interaction can be navigated but not conquered. Description, in other words, is fate. All who dare to challenge the order—Carter's transgression—will do much more damage than good. The idealist makes a bad situation much worse by imagining a better world in the face of immutable realities. As one popular saying among foreign policy practitioners goes: "Without vision, men die. With it, more men die." 70 (continued) The implications of this social philosophy are stark. Tremendous human suffering can be rationalized away as the inevitable product of the impersonal international system of power relations. World leaders are actively encouraged by the realists to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of international politics according to the established rules of political engagement. This deliberate limitation of interest excuses leaders from making hard moral choices. While a moralist Protestant like Jimmy Carter sees history as a progressive moral struggle to realize abstract ideals in the world, the realist believes that it is dangerous to struggle against the inexorable. The moral ambiguities of political and social ethics that have dogged philosophy and statesmanship time out of mind are simply written out of the equation. Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true. The greatest barrier to engaging the realists in serious dialogue about their premises is that they deny that these questions can be seriously debated. First, realists teach a moral philosophy that denies itself. There is exceedingly narrow ground, particularly in the technical vocabulary of the social sciences, for discussing the moral potential of humanity or the limitations of human action. Yet, as we have seen in the tragedy of Jimmy Carter, a philosophical perspective on these very questions is imparted through the back door. It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description. The purveyors of this philosophical outlook will not admit this to themselves, let alone to potential interlocutors. [End Page 21] Second, and most importantly, alternative perspectives are not admitted as possibilities—realism is a perspective that as a matter of first principles denies all others. There is, as we have seen in the Carter narrative, alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences. Those who do not see this underlying order of things are idealists or amateurs. Such people have no standing in debate because they do not see the intractable scene that dominates human action. Dialogue is permissible within the parameters of the presumed order, but those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate. Third, the environmental determinism of political realism, even though it is grounded in human social nature, is antihumanist. Much of the democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity is in some sense socially self-determining. Society as social contract is a joint project which, over time, is subject to dialectical improvement. Foreign policy realism, as we have seen, presupposes that there is an order to human relations that is beyond the power of humans to mediate. 71 When you add to this the moral imperative to be faithful to the order (the moral of the Carter narrative), then democratic forms lose a great deal of their value. Indeed, there has been a great deal of hand wringing in international relations literature about how the masses are inexorably drawn to idealists like Carter and Wilson. Morgenthau states this much more frankly than most of his intellectual descendants: [the] thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy can be diametrically opposed to the rhetoric and action by which the masses and their representatives are likely to be moved. . . . The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. 72 Some realists, based on this empirical observation, openly propose that a realist foreign policy be cloaked in a moral facade so that it will be publicly palatable. Kissinger's mistake, they say, was that he was too honest. Morgenthau concludes that "the simple philosophy and techniques of the moral crusade are useful and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshaling public opinion behind a given policy; they are but blunt weapons in the struggle of nations for dominance over the minds of men." If one believes that social scientists have unique access to an inexorable social reality which is beyond the control of humanity—and which it is social suicide to ignore—it is easy to see how democratic notions of consent and self-determination can give way to the reign of manipulative propaganda. 73 There is another lesson that can be drawn from the savaging of Carter in international relations scholarship for those who seek to broaden the terms of American foreign policy thought and practice. Those who would challenge the realist orthodoxy [End Page 22] face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism. Careful and balanced academic critiques, although indispensable, are unlikely to be a match for such formidable symbolic ammunition. Post-realism, if it is to make any advance against the realist battlements, must marshal equally powerful symbolic resources. What is needed, in addition to academic critiques aimed at other scholars, is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric.

**They Say “Scenario Planning Good”**

**Turn—scenario planning makes us less prepared and causes more wars and disasters—planning for the worst case scenario makes it inevitable—the logic of preparedness was exposed as a fiction by 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina**

**Der Derian, 2005** (James, Prof. of IR @ UMass – Amherst and Brown University, “An Accident Waiting to Happen,” September 4, The New York Times, http://hir.harvard.edu/predicting-the-present/national-security)

It often takes a catastrophe to reveal the illusory beliefs we continue to harbor in national and homeland security. To keep us safe, we place our faith in national borders and guards, bureaucracies and experts, technologies and armies. These and other instruments of national security are empowered and legitimated by the assumption that it falls upon the sovereign country to protect us from the turbulent state of nature and anarchy that permanently lies in wait offshore and over the horizon for the unprepared and inadequately defended. But this parochial fear, posing as a realistic worldview, has recently taken some very hard knocks. Prior to September 11, 2001, national borders were thought to be necessary and sufficient to keep our enemies at bay; upon entry to Baghdad, a virtuous triumphalism and a revolution in military affairs were touted as the best means to bring peace and democracy to the Middle East; and before Hurricane Katrina, emergency preparedness and an intricate system of levees were supposed to keep New Orleans safe and dry. The intractability of disaster, especially its unexpected, unplanned, unprecedented nature, erodes not only the very distinction of the local, national, and global, but, assisted and amplified by an unblinking global media, reveals the contingent and highly interconnected character of life in general. Yet when it comes to dealing with natural and unnatural disasters, we continue to expect (and, in the absence of a credible alternative, understandably so) if not certainty and total safety at least a high level of probability and competence from our national and homeland security experts However, between the mixed metaphors and behind the metaphysical concepts given voice by US Homeland Security Director Michael Chertoff early into the Katrina crisis, there lurks an uneasy recognition that this administration—and perhaps no national government—is up to the task of managing incidents that so rapidly cascade into global events. Indeed, they suggest that our national plans and preparations for the “big one”—a force-five hurricane, terrorist attack, pandemic disease—have become part of the problem, not the solution. His use of hyberbolic terms like “ultra-catastrophe” and “fall-out” is telling: such events exceed not only local and national capabilities, but the capacity of conventional language itself. An easy deflection would be to lay the blame on the neoconservative faithful of the first term of US President George W. Bush, who, viewing through an inverted Wilsonian prism the world as they would wish it to be, have now been forced by natural and unnatural disasters to face the world as it really is—and not even the most sophisticated public affairs machine of dissimulations, distortions, and lies can close this gap. However, the discourse of the second Bush term has increasingly returned to the dominant worldview of national security, realism. And if language is, as Nietzsche claimed, a prisonhouse, realism is its supermax penitentiary. Based on linear notions of causality, a correspondence theory of truth, and the materiality of power, how can realism possibly account—let alone prepare or provide remedies—for complex catastrophes, like the toppling of the World Trade Center and attack on the Pentagon by a handful of jihadists armed with box-cutters and a few months of flight-training? A force-five hurricane that might well have begun with the flapping of a butterfly’s wings? A northeast electrical blackout that started with a falling tree limb in Ohio? A possible pandemic triggered by the mutation of an avian virus? How, for instance, are we to measure the immaterial power of the CNN-effect on the first Gulf War, the Al-Jazeera-effect on the Iraq War, or the Nokia-effect on the London terrorist bombings? For events of such complex, non-linear origins and with such tightly-coupled, quantum effects, the national security discourse of realism is simply not up to the task. Worse, what if the “failure of imagination” identified by the 9/11 Commission is built into our national and homeland security systems? What if the reliance on planning for the catastrophe that never came reduced our capability to flexibly respond and improvise for the “ultra-catastrophe” that did? What if worse-case scenarios, simulation training, and disaster exercises—as well as border guards, concrete barriers and earthen levees—not only prove inadequate but might well act as force-multipliers—what organizational theorists identify as “negative synergy” and “cascading effects” —that produce the automated bungling (think Federal Emergency Management Agency) that transform isolated events and singular attacks into global disasters? Just as “normal accidents” are built into new technologies—from the Titanic sinking to the Chernobyl meltdown to the Challenger explosion—we must ask whether “ultra-catastrophes” are no longer the exception but now part and parcel of densely networked systems that defy national management; in other words, “planned disasters.” What, then, is to be done? A first step is to move beyond the wheel-spinning debates that perennially keep security discourse always one step behind the global event. It might well be uni-, bi-, or multi-polar, but it is time to recognize that the power configuration of the states-system is rapidly being subsumed by a heteropolar matrix, in which a wide range of different actors and technological drivers are producing profound global effects through interconnectivity. Varying in identity, interests, and strength, these new actors and drivers gain advantage through the broad bandwidth of information technology, for networked communication systems provide the means to traverse political, economic, religious, and cultural boundaries, changing not only how we interpret events, but making it ever more difficult to maintain the very distinction of intended from accidental events. According to the legal philosopher of Nazi Germany, Carl Schmitt, when the state is unable to deliver on its traditional promissory notes of safety, security, and well-being through legal, democratic means, it will necessarily exercise the sovereign “exception:” declaring a state of emergency, defining friend from foe, and, if necessary, eradicating the threat to the state. But what if the state, facing the global event, cannot discern the accidental from the intentional? An external attack from an internal auto-immune response? The natural as opposed to the “planned disaster”? The enemy within from the enemy without? We can, as the United States has done since September 11, continue to treat catastrophic threats as issues of national rather than global security, and go it alone. However, once declared, bureaucratically installed, and repetitively gamed, national states of emergency grow recalcitrant and become prone to even worse disasters. As Paul Virilio, master theorist of the war machine and the integral accident once told me: “The full-scale accident is now the prolongation of total war by other means.”

**2NC Energy Kritik**

**Plan accelerates energy addiction. Renunciation reclaims the possibility of politics**

**Robert – 03** (Energy, Jean Robert, teacher and activist for alternative technologies, taught at Penn State as part of a group of intellectuals invited by Ivan Illich to venture into researches on the archeology of modern certainties, teaches at school of architecture of the University of Cuernavaca and La Salle University, graduated as an architect from the Swiss Polytechnical Institute (Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule), former UN consultant, <http://www.pudel.uni-bremen.de/pdf/energy_1.pdf>)

In contrast, **both E and "energy" radically threaten the possibility of politics**. Both carry the scientific disdain for conceptual distinctions rooted in everyday experience. For instance, Helmholtz asserted that E was the imponderable prime mover -- whether of invisible molecules under the bell curve, blood in the veins, or stars in the sky. Others indiscriminately applied the words "work," "duty" and "force" to steam-engines, pumps, workers and thunder. By such characteristic scientific disregard for sensible differences, Helmholtz and other scientists prepared the ground for "energy." **"Energy" is neither a concept nor an experience. Instead it functions as a fog that blurs the distinctions between nature and machines,** living organisms and persons, mechanical work and human action. **It was the misplaced concreteness generated by "energy" that:** led Karl Marx to impute the capacity for labor to people (1887); fooled neo-classical economists into conserving utility as if it could neither be created nor destroyed (Mirowski 1989); **seduced** Sergei **Podolinsky** and his contemporary students **to imagine nature as a primordial economy** (see, Georgescu-Roegen 1971); **prompted** Stanley **Jevons to think of coal as a scarce natural resource** (1865); encouraged the chronometry of physical activities by Entienne-Jules Marey (1874), the scientific management of industrial work by Frederick Taylor (1911), and the time and motion studies of the homemaker by Lillian Gilbreth (1927). **"Energy" fed fantasies of reorganizing society and reshaping individuals into efficient and productive things. Both capitalist and socialist regimes fell under the spell cast by "energy": neither denied that the unending growth in "energy slaves" was the road to freedom. Both ignored the fact people are reflected as mere "human motors" in the mirror of an energy slave** (Rabinbach 1990). **By now this is taken-for-granted. That people have "energy needs" goes unquestioned, partly because "energy" has almost transformed society into a laboratory. Professionals of every stripe now offer competing ways to optimize the relation between "energy resources" and "energy needs." Such "energy policies" are blind to the truth that neither cars nor human motors can act politically. They perpetuate the scientific disregard for sensible differences and thereby deepen man's enslavement to his "energy" slaves. Man is no less enslaved whether the car runs on coal or hydrogen; whether the light bulb shines because of water or wind. Neither the technocrat nor the ecocrat can lessen man's slavishness as long as both cannot see the commonsense distinctions erased by "energy." It would a political act to stop looking at the wonderland that appears through "energy" glasses.** To recover such a clear-eyed vision, one cannot do much better than to reread Illich (1973).

**The Affirmative framework assures facism, ecological apocalypse and destroys all value to life. Renunciation initiates a political process that demystifies the affirmative’s framing and turns the conversation to the challenge of building a convivial society – renunciation solves**

**Professor Illich – 75** (PhD at the University of Salzburg (an exploration of the nature of historical knowledge), frmr Visiting Professor of Philosophy and of Science, Technology, and Society at Penn State, also taught at the University of Bremen, Tools for Conviviality)

**If** within the very near future **[hu]man[s] cannot set limits to the interference of [our]** his **tools with the environment a**nd practice effective birth control, **the next generations will experience the gruesome apocalypse predicted by many ecologists.** Faced with these impending disasters, **society can stand in wait of survival within limits set and enforced by bureaucratic dictatorship. Or it can engage in a political process** by the use of legal and political procedures. Ideologically biased interpretations of the past have made the recognition of political process increasingly difficult. Liberty has been interpreted as a right to power tools, a right claimed without reasonable limitation by individuals and private associations in capitalist countries and by the state in socialist societies. **Recovery becomes feasible only if the fundamental structure of Western societies is clearly recognized and reclaimed.** Analogous efforts to recover entirely different formal structures will become necessary when former political or cultural colonies shake off the Western mode of production. 8A (0321) **The bureaucratic management of human survival is unacceptable on both ethical and political grounds. It would also be** as **futile** as former attempts at mass therapy. This does not, of course, mean that a majority might not at first submit to it. People could be so frightened by the increasing evidence of growing population and dwindling resources that they would voluntarily put their destiny into the hands of Big Brothers. **Technocratic caretakers could be mandated to set limits on growth in every dimension, and to set them just at the point beyond which further production would mean utter destruction. Such a kakotopia could maintain the industrial age at the highest endurable level of output**. 8B (0322) **Man would live in a plastic bubble that would protect his survival and make it increasingly worthless.** Since man's tolerance would become the most serious limitation to growth, the alchemist's endeavor would be renewed in the attempt to produce a monstrous type of man fit to live among reason's dreams. A major function of engineering would become the psychogenetic tooling of man himself as a condition for further growth. People would be confined from birth to death in a world-wide schoolhouse, treated in a world-wide hospital, surrounded by television screens, and **the man-made environment would be distinguishable in name only from a world-wide prison**. 8C (0323) **The alternative to managerial fascism is a political process by which people decide how much of any scarce resource is the most any member of society can claim;** a process in which they agree to keep limits relatively stationary over a long time, and by which they **set a premium on the constant search for new ways [of] to have an ever larger percentage of the population join in doing ever more with ever less**. Such a political choice of a frugal society remains a pious dream unless it can be shown that it is not only necessary but also possible: (1) **to define concrete procedures by which more people** are enlightened about the nature of our present crisis **and will come to understand that limits are necessary and a convivial life style desirable;** (2) to bring the largest number of people into now suppressed organizations which claim their right to a frugal life style and keep them satisfied and therefore committed to convivial life; and (3) to discover and revalue the political or legal tools that are accepted within a society and learn how to use them to establish and protect convivial life where it emerges. **Such procedures may sound idealistic at the present moment. This is not proof that they cannot become effective a**s the present crisis deepens **The ultimate obstacle to the restructuring of society is** **not** the lack of information about which limits are needed, nor **the lack of people who would accept [it]** them if they became inevitable, **but** **the power of political myths**. 8E1 (0326) **Almost everyone in rich societies is a destructive consumer**. Almost everyone is, in some way, engaged in aggression against the milieu. **Destructive consumers constitute a numerical majority. Myth transforms them into a political one.** Numerical majorities come to form a mythical voting bloc on a nonexistent issue; "they" are invoked as the unbeatable guardians of vested interest in growth. This mythical majority paralyzes political action. At closer inspection, "they" are a number of reasonable individuals. One is an ecologist who takes a jet plane to a conference on protecting the environment from further pollution. Another is an economist who knows that growing efficiency renders work increasingly scarce; he tries to create new sources of employment. Neither of them has the same interests as the slum-dweller in Detroit who purchases his color TV on time. The three belong no more to a voting bloc that will defend growth than clerks, repairmen, and salesmen are somehow politically homogenized because each fears for his job, needs a car, and wants medicine for his children. 8E2 (0327)

# 2NC Trade

**They endorse the idea that global trade will cause global peace. This seeming opposition actually strengthens the Trade is War metaphor – it elicits the Trade is War metaphor, but ascribes it to others.**

Phillip **Eubanks**, prof of English at Northern Illinois University **2000** [A War of Words in the Discourse of Trade: The Rhetorical Constitution of Metaphor. p. 67-69]

If we recognize, along with Defoe, that a nation's war chest is generated by international trade, we can infer a literal version of Trade Is War: international trade finances war. At the same time, Defoe assumes, as many before him have assumed, that trade is not war, it is peace. That is, where nations are concerned, Defoe understands trade to be a basic tool of war, but for individuals trade pacifies instead: "Trade is a friend to Peace; and provides for the People a far better Way: Trade sets them to work for their Bread, not to fight for it" (74). Thus, we have said since the time of Defoe, and probably long before, that trade is peace, that war is for economic gain, that money is military power, and that international trade finances war. In sum, the literal concept trade is peace is implicated in a set of interrelated notions that form a nuanced, even contradictory, understanding of the relationship between peace, war, and trade. With all its complication, trade is peace still remains a stable part of Trade Is War's constituting conversation in the nascent United States. As the colonies revolt primarily over trade issues, Thomas Paine articulates his vision of a peaceful, commercial future, where a military alliance between Britain and the colonies is unnecessary: Besides what have we to do with setting the world at defiance? Our plan is commerce, and that, well attended to, will secure us the peace and friendship of all of Europe; because it is in the interest of all of Europe to have America a free port. Her trade will always be a protection, and her barrenness of silver and gold secure her from invaders. (40) Paine's observation may seem commonsensical, but it is not necessarily empirically sound. While insisting that peace is a natural consequence of 36 trade, Paine acknowledges that the point of war is economic gain, hence the importance of America's "barrenness of silver and gold." Thus, within Paine's own logic, trade does not by itself promote peace. In fact, whether economic conditions will promote war or peace is unpredictable. When silver and gold were discovered in the United States territories some sixty years later, the discovery did not invite an invasion but rather led to an explosion of free enterprise. Yet the commonsense quality of trade is peace is nothing if not durable. In a focus group conducted for this study, a college senior majoring in business at a major midwestern university expresses her version of trade is peace, and it remains as viable as it was in Genesis.' Trade is cooperative, I think. When I think of the Japanese and the U.S., there's total-I don't know what it's called, but-we import so many more goods than the Japanese import of ours, and if you create war between the two, it's not going to help increase trade. So you have to be cooperative, and you have to be the opposite of fighting you know what I mean-to trade with people. You're not going to two warring tribes are not going to trade or barter with each other if they're fighting against each other. The conceptual residue of antiquity is unconsciously re-envoiced by this student, but it is not unusual for the literal and metaphoric linkage between trade and war to reach backwards in time, as it does with the young woman's reference to "warring tribes." "Trade Is Peace" Versus Trade Is War It may seem, as a logical matter, that trade is peace can hardly avoid contrastive intercourse with Trade Is War; they appear to be direct opposites, unavoidable contradictions. However, the complexity of trade is peace as a literal concept makes it all but impossible for actually uttered instances of trade is peace to directly repudiate Trade Is War. When we assert literally that trade is peace, we simultaneously understand the complex relationship between peace, trade, and war and the fluid way these relationships are typically applied to nations, corporations, and individuals. Likewise, when we metaphorically assert that trade is war, we understand that money, trade, and war are interconnected in literal, complex ways. Trade Is War and trade is peace refute one another, but the rebuttal is always as many-sided as the prompting assertion. In a general way, however, Trade Is War persistently elicits a responsive trade is peace and vice versa. Responding to the college student quoted above, a male student also majoring in business answers trade is peace with Trade Is War:

**Reject both Trade is War and Trade is Peace – Trade is War is hyperbole that creates enemies and causes international aggression. Trade is Peace justifies slavery and dehumanization in the name of economic disengagement – this causes untold structural violence**

Phillip **Eubanks**, prof of English at Northern Illinois University **2000** [A War of Words in the Discourse of Trade: The Rhetorical Constitution of Metaphor. p. 67-69]

While conducting this study, and especially in my role as moderator of focus groups, I felt it important to remain neutral about the relative worth of trade metaphors. I confess now that while I have been successful in not expressing my judgments to others, I have not been dispassionate about the issues raised by Trade Is War, Markets Are Containers, Trade Is Friendship, Trade Is A Journey, and trade is peace. And being exposed to discussions of these metaphors has led me to some surprising conclusions- conclusions that, at the outset, I would have found strange and, indeed, unacceptable. Like most Americans, I have favored the globalist position, assuming almost as a matter of faith that protectionism is futile and destructive. Like most Americans of Baby Boom age, I find commercial war metaphors troublesome. I was weaned on the politics of Vietnam, and the intervening years have only provided further evidence of that war's moral vacuity. For that reason, I have no liking for the images, words, and spirit of war-not even in playful only language metaphors. But upon long reflection, it seems to me that of the social and economic dangers we face today, Trade Is War represents a small one, and its literal counterpart, trade is peace, a large and growing one. Trade is peace is the great truism of the post-World War II era. It is the touchstone of well-intentioned globalism, which is motivated by the same spirit of peace that inspired the Marshall Plan and the United Nations. What could be wrong with such a spirit? In fact, I believe there is much wrong with it as it is applied to trade policy. Before World War II, we lived in a world of contained markets. National governments protected local commerce by using high tariffs to shield against foreign competition. This "protectionism" is often denounced now as short-sighted, fear-inspired, and dangerous. In some ways, that is so. But the postwar era has its own excesses. In its desire to help devastated foreign countries rebuild and underdeveloped countries mature-all in the hope of avoiding a third world war-the United States has opened its markets to all comers. The resulting loss in manufacturing-of automobiles, consumer electronics, textiles, and semiconductors-has been considerable. But the loss that should concern us most is not the loss of manufacturing dollars. What we sacrifice by indiscriminately opening our markets is two hundred years of social progress. In the nineteenth century, the United States legally permitted slave, child, or coerced labor. Even free adult workers would have been astonished to hear of a forty-hour work week-with paid vacation. A heavy price was paid in order to right the wrongs of the unfettered marketplace. We fought a civil war to end slavery. The trade union movement paid for its victories with blood. However, because we have almost universally accepted the notion that trade is peace-both that It is a necessary activity of peace and that it engenders peace-each of us is more likely than not to wear clothes, drive cars, and compose books on computers that are produced by slave or child labor. At the very least, we depend upon world markets to provide us with goods produced by workers who are paid deplorable wages and who have no right to bargain collectively. Trade may be peace-but is it peace at any price? When we open our borders to products produced by enslaved, under aged, and oppressed workers, we pay a moral cost, to be sure. This cost, however, goes beyond being drawn into the ethical vacuum of buying and using tainted goods. We face an even greater ethical problem when we squander our ability to influence foreign conditions. By failing to preserve minimum acceptable conditions within our borders while acquiescing to appalling conditions outside of them, we recast all of what we do commercially into a transnational agnosticism. Simply put, the original reason for promoting free trade was to promote peace, a presumed natural consequence of trade. That rationale remains prominent in trade discussion today. But the unintended consequence has been the creation of nationless corporations for whom a moral and ethical obligation to workers is hardly a matter for concern. Unions once bargained for a living wage and decent working conditions. Now enormous multinational corporations are increasingly accountable only to faceless stockholders who are not confronted daily with the tie between exploitation and profit. We need only to check our retirement plans to verify that we are, most of us, among these faceless stockholders. Meanwhile, as factories and jobs are dispersed around the globe, millions who once benefited from social progress in the United States are now thrust into uncertainty, working for lower wages and left relatively powerless in relation to employers. The devastating consequences of this are perhaps not strikingly evident today because we are enjoying a flush economy. Most workers in the United States currently derive some benefit from the law of supply and demand with respect to labor. But a downturn in the U.S. economy could bring the problem into stark relief. Moreover, even with today's robust economy, we see can see fissures in the social foundation of the U.S. commercial environment. In real dollars, average wages are falling steadily. And the disparity between executive pay and worker pay is greater than ever. At the turn of the century, J. P.Morgan said that executive pay should never exceed worker pay by more than twenty fold. Today top executives make more than two hundred times the salary of the average factory worker (Kadleck, Smolowe). This tangible harm to domestic workers emanates from the seemingly commendable idea that trade is peace. Am I recommending, then, that we revive and claim the metaphor Trade Is War? No. No matter how we may try to delimit it, the standard Western model of Trade Is War entails aggressive action toward others. Neither the United States nor any other nation benefits from commercial harm to others. However, I do claim that Markets Are Containers has positive value. That is, we need to retain some sense of separation between our markets and others'-not for the sake of hoarding profit but for the sake of maintaining a humane working environment. While most nationalistic stances emphasize the wages lost by some American workers, I urge an emphasis upon social progress lost by the United States as a whole. We cannot ameliorate conditions around the world while permitting our own conditions to deteriorate. Some may argue that when we treat our market as a container, protecting our workers behind a wall of tariffs, we deprive equally deserving workers abroad of the chance to make a living, no matter how meager at first, and that we further deprive foreign workers the opportunity to make economic progress in the future. But this argument follows the false logic of trade is peace. It cannot be helpful for us to fund oppressed labor with pieces of our own economy. The way to improve foreign workers' conditions is through political action, not through economic acquiescence. Meanwhile, our own corporate community needs to restore its productive bond with its workers of all levels. A corporation or a country that is not answerable to its own workers will be answerable to no one, especially not while its profits continue to grow. To be clear, in claiming Markets Are Containers, I do not also claim Trade Is War. Remember that while Trade Is War entails Markets Are Containers, Markets Are Containers does not necessarily imply Trade Is War. Some of our most common instances of Markets Are Containers either dramatically attenuate Trade Is War or can just as easily suggest other metaphors such as Trade Is A Game. At the same time, when I argue the case for Markets Are Containers, I am suggesting a somewhat novel interpretation of what containment means. Certainly I do not intend to emphasize the exclusionary aspect of containment suggested by, say, the fortress metaphor. Indeed, I do not know of a common locution that inflects Markets Are Containers in the way I have in mind, a way that emphasizes preservation of social well-being without at the same time fearing or prohibiting outside influence. Thus, what I offer is a position that requires a new metaphor.